Can animals think? One of the fi rst steps towards answering this question should consist in clarifying the relevant concept of thinking. For, trivially, it has to be established in advance what is up for debate: Exactly what are non-human animals supposed to be able to do or not able to do? Reinhard Brandt, in his book entitled Können Tiere denken?, is right in emphasising the importance of this conceptual-and therefore philosophical-task.
What are these core elements-or this core form? According to Brandt, the concept of judgement is suited for singling out the central building blocks of thinking. Simply put, judgements are the 'mental equivalents' of predications. Like elementary predicative assertions, elementary judgements-the primary units on the mental side-have a subject-predicate-structure of the form ›a is F‹ and ›a is not F‹. On this basis, the relation between thinking and judgements (or judging) which Brandt has in mind can be formulated as follows:
In order to be able to think, one has to be able to form judgements of the types ›a is F‹ and ›a is not F‹.
Not all mental acts and processes which deserve the title 'thinking' are judgements. Rather, the idea seems to be that the notion of thinking comprises all mental acts which presuppose the ability to form judgements.
1 Consequently, the truth of sentences of the type "Animal X can think" presupposes the truth of the sentence "X is able to make judgements of the forms ›a is F‹ and ›a is not F‹".
In further elucidating the concept of judgement, Brandt highlights two uncontentious features of judgements (Brandt (2009), 32):
(i) By forming judgements, we are able to refer to things (most of which belong to the external world). Th erefore, by forming a judgement of the type ›a is F‹ or ›a is not F‹, we refer-in the case of success only, of course-to object a. And in doing so, we at once predicate something of this object: that it is F or that it is not F. (ii) Judgements have a truth value-they are either true or false.
Additionally, Brandt makes a claim which-in the fi rst place-is about the ability to form judgements (and probably only indirectly about judgements and the concept of judgement):
(iii) Th e ability to form judgements comprises the ability to ascribe properties to objects by means of judgements of the form ›a is F‹ (affi rmation (Bejahung)) and the ability to deny properties of objects by means of judgements of the form ›a is not F‹ (negation (Verneinung)).
